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- 电子邮箱：qiany@uestc.edu.cn
- 入职时间：2000-07-01
- 所在单位：经济与管理学院
- 学历：博士研究生毕业
- 办公地点：Room C217, SEM Building, Qingshuihe Campus, UESTC
- 性别：女
- 联系方式：qiany@uestc.edu.cn
- 学位：管理学博士学位
- 职称：教授
- 在职信息：在职人员
- 毕业院校：电子科技大学
- 博士生导师
- 曾获荣誉：四川省科技进步奖一等奖，电子科技大学“成电创新教学示范奖”，优秀硕士学位论文指导教师奖。
- 学科：管理科学与工程
Demand screening in launching a new private label product
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- 所属单位：[1] School of Management, University of Electronic Science and Technology of China, 610054, China; [2] School of Economics and Management, Tsinghua University, 100084, China
- 发表刊物：Proceedings - ICSSSM'06: 2006 International Conference on Service Systems and Service Management
- 关键字：Contracts - Costs - Information analysis - Mathematical models - Systems analysis
- 摘要：This paper considers a screening mechanism which deals with information asymmetry of demand in launching a new private label product through a distribution channel where the retailer has private information on demand. An uninformed manufacturer proposes a lump sum payment contract, which a retailer either accepts or rejects. Rejection yields zero profits for both retailer and manufacturer. If the retailer accepts, the manufacturer sets a wholesale price to maximize her expected profit, and the retailer responses with an optimal retail price. Particularly, when the parameters satisfy certain conditions, there exists a unique separating equilibrium, which both firms make their optimal decisions. The uninformed manufacturer can use a lump sum transfer payment T as an instrument to screen the informed retailer's type on demand. It is shown whether the uninformed player can screen the informed player's type or not by designing a transfer payment contract, it ties in the player's market power within the distribution channel. ? 2006 IEEE.
- 文献类型：Conference article (CA)
- 卷号：1
- 页面范围：345-349
- 是否译文：否