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- 电子邮箱：qiany@uestc.edu.cn
- 入职时间：2000-07-01
- 所在单位：经济与管理学院
- 学历：博士研究生毕业
- 办公地点：Room C217, SEM Building, Qingshuihe Campus, UESTC
- 性别：女
- 联系方式：qiany@uestc.edu.cn
- 学位：管理学博士学位
- 职称：教授
- 在职信息：在职人员
- 毕业院校：电子科技大学
- 博士生导师
- 曾获荣誉：四川省科技进步奖一等奖，电子科技大学“成电创新教学示范奖”，优秀硕士学位论文指导教师奖。
- 学科：管理科学与工程
Information sharing in a competitive supply chain with capacity constraint
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- 所属单位：[1]Tsinghua Univ, Sch Econ & Management, Beijing 100084, Peoples R China;[2]Univ Elect Sci & Technol China, Sch Management & Econ, Chengdu 610054, Peoples R China;[3]CITIC Private Equ Funds Management Co Ltd, Beijing 100005, Peoples R China;[4]Beijing Foreign Studies Univ, Int Business Sch, Beijing 100089, Peoples R China
- 发表刊物：FLEXIBLE SERVICES AND MANUFACTURING JOURNAL
- 关键字：Supply chain management; Information sharing; Production capacity; Uncertainty; Horizontal competition
- 摘要：This paper studies the incentives for vertical demand information sharing in a two-echelon supply chain formed by many downstream retailers and one upstream manufacturer with a limited production capacity. The retailers are engaged in a Cournot competition, and endowed with some private information about the demand. The total order of all the retailers may exceed the manufacturer＇s capacity, and in that case, an allocation strategy is required. We show that a discriminated allocation strategy will encourage the retailers to share their demand information. We also find the condition under which full information sharing can be reached. Furthermore, we prove that when the manufacturer cannot satisfy the total order of all the retailers, social welfare and consumer surplus will be locked by the capacity.
- 文献类型：Article
- 卷号：24
- 期号：4
- 页面范围：549-574
- ISSN号：1936-6582
- 是否译文：否